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The Plans for Russian Expansion in
the New World and the North
Pacific in the Eighteenth and
Nineteenth Centuries
Andrei V. Grinev
I. Introduction
1  Such plans for expansion did not arise in a vacuum. By the beginning of the eighteenth
century the authorities  in  eastern Siberia  had begun to  obtain more or  less  reliable
information about the unknown lands lying to the east of Chukotka, that is, Alaska. As a
result  of  several  exploratory  expeditions  between  1728  and  1742  Russian  mariners
discovered vast territories and numerous islands that became part of so-called Russian
America, which included the territory of the present state of Alaska, a small enclave in
California (Fort Ross), and the Commander Islands (off the coast of Kamchatka). From
1799 the American possessions of the empire were subject to the monopolistic Russian-
American Company (RAC),  which governed Alaska until 1867 when it was sold to the
United States (Fort Ross had already changed hands in 1841). The concession of Alaska
signified the withdrawal of Russia from the “American bridgehead,” and its expansion
was now entirely confined to the Asian continent. Up to this time, projects for colonial
expansion directed at transforming the northern part of the Pacific basin into a “Russian
sea” and increasing the possessions of the empire in the New World had been repeatedly
promoted by government and private individuals.
2  These plans were explored and studied even during the existence of Russian America.
Thus, in 1861 Captain of 2nd Rank P. N. Golovin pointed out that the well-known merchant
G. I. Shelikhov (who founded in 1784 the first permanent Russian settlement on Kodiak
Island), as well as A. A. Baranov, who managed Shelikhov’s company in America, and
Shelikhov’s  son-in-law,  Chamberlain  N.  P.  Rezanov,  planned  to  expand  Russian
possessions from Alaska to California and to control at least part of this rich region,
together with the mouth of the Amur, Sakhalin Island, and one of the Hawaiian Islands.
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Golovin wrote: “The plan was vast, bold, but possible; however, inconsequential intrigues,
which were revived as a consequence of the immoderate ambition of individuals who had
assisted Rezanov, stopped the execution of his well-conceived plan at the very beginning.
After Rezanov’s death (in 1807 - A.G.) and the removal of Baranov (in 1818 - A.G.) the plan
was  dropped.”1 Somewhat  later,  in  1865,  the  eminent  publicist  D.  I.  Zavalishin  also
reported on ambitious projects related to the North Pacific. In his words, an “ingenious
plan” of A. A. Baranov existed regarding Russia’s subjection of the whole northern part of
the Pacific Ocean, beginning from the mouth of the Amur and Sakhalin to California,
including the Hawaiian Islands,  a  plan then supported by Rezanov and the board of
directors of the RAC. In Zavalishin’s opinion, the most favorable moment for colonial
acquisition, at least in California, was the period 1824–1825 when ships of the Russian
naval fleet and of the RAC commanded the North Pacific basin.2
3  Some modern authors essentially repeat these assertions. Thus, E. M. Roginskii writes
that Zavalishin supported Baranov, the governor of Russian America, who “unconsciously
but instinctively tried to ingeniously enclose the northern part of  the Eastern Ocean
among  our  possessions,  adding  and  isolating  them  from  Udskoi  Island  to  Sitka  by
occupation  of  California,  the  Sandwich  (Hawaiian  –  A.G.)  Islands,  and  the  southern
Kuriles, which would lead to occupation of the mouth of the Amur and other points to the
south.”3 However Zavalishin was by no means able to support Baranov in his “ingenious”
expansionistic undertakings for one simple reason. Zavalishin, a young naval officer, had
arrived in the capital of Russian America—Novo-Arkhangel’sk (Sitka)—aboard the frigate
Kreiser in 1823, whereas Baranov, the first governor of the Russian colonies, died en route
to St. Petersburg in April 1819.
4  If the elaboration of colonial plans for the New World and the Pacific Ocean basin has
been  attributed  in  prerevolutionary  historiography  almost  exclusively  to  private
individuals,  then  in  Soviet  prewar  historiography  the  chief  initiator  of  expansionist
projects has been identified as the Tsarist government. Thus, academician B. D. Grekov
wrote in 1939, in the introduction to the monograph of Professor S. B. Okun’: “Similar to
this, as the English government for 200 years carried out war for possession of the Indies
cloaked under  the  name East  India  Company,  so  the  Tsarist  government  intensively
fought for almost one hundred years for the shores of the Pacific Ocean, cloaked under
the  name  Russian-American  Company.”4 Okun’  himself  emphasized  in  his  work  the
unrestrained striving of Tsarism for colonial possessions, used for this purpose its proxy
the RAC:
The Tsarist government set before the Russian-American Company the task of great
political significance. Precisely in this way it expected to realize grandiose plans of
expansion, as a result of which the northern part of the Pacific Ocean would be
transformed into “home” waters for the Russian Empire. This plan assumed further
fortification of Russia on the western shore of North America, including California,
the Hawaiian Islands, the southern part of Sakhalin, and the mouth of the Amur.
These colonies, together with Kamchatka, Alaska, and the Aleutian Islands, which
already  belonged  to  Russia,  would  turn  it  into  the  absolute  master  of  all  the
northern basin of the Pacific Ocean.5
5 This program for the broad expansion of Tsarism was put forward in the late eighteenth
and  early  nineteenth  centuries,  and  it  led  to  the  creation  of  the  Russian-American
Company. As Okun’ noted, it began to be carried out at a moment when the political
situation made its realization very difficult. It required an open break with England—its
primary rival in the North Pacific. However, in spite of mutual antagonism, St. Petersburg
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preferred not to move toward an open clash. Its politics in relation to England in the
Pacific  Ocean,  Okun’  suggested,  were determined by events elsewhere.  St.  Petersburg
opposed the French Revolution and its effects across Europe, and this objectively drew
the positions of Russia and England together in the First and Second Coalitions against
France. This struggle, together with the effort to support legitimism in Spain, did not
provide  Tsarism the  possibility  of  actively  encroaching  upon  California,  which  once
belonged to Spain. Okun’ has written in his monograph: “Thus, in the way of Russian
expansion in the Pacific Ocean, in the way of broad development of the activity of the
Russian-American Company, stood the aspiration of Alexander I to preserve the Sacred
Union, which forced him to concentrate all attention on European affairs. This signified
the failure of the grandiose plans, which once the government itself had proposed and
supported and to which the merchant circles connected with the company clung.”6
The original headquarters of the Russian-American Company at Moika 72, St.Petersburg
II. Too Grandiose a Plan
6  “The  merchant  circles,”  mentioned  by  Okun’  were  represented  primarily  by  G.  I.
Shelikhov, who as early as 1786 proposed the initiative of subjecting for Russia the whole
North American coast as far south as 40° north latitude (n. lat.), that is, to California.7
According to Okun’,  “Russian merchants,  had by that time,  based on a decree of  the
government, hastened to create on any occasion some circumstance for seizing it in the
future.”8 Besides Shelikhov (who died in 1795) there was A.A. Baranov, who was living in
Alaska from 1790 onwards and who was governor of the Russian colonies there from 1799
until his departure in 1818. Baranov contributed no small amount to the realization of
this expansion. In addition, Okun’ could not disregard the chief prosecutor of the Senate,
the active Chamberlain of  the Court,  Cavalier  of  the Maltese Order,  and head of  the
diplomatic mission to Japan, N. P. Rezanov, who in the mid-1800s also actively pursued
grandiose plans of expansion in the North Pacific.9 The latter was one of the creators of
the  RAC,  a  large  stockholder  in  the  company  and  simultaneously  controller  of  its
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activities on behalf of the government. This circumstance permitted Okun’ to emphasize
the state character of Russian expansion in the New World and to define the RAC as a
government organization that served as a distinctive tool of Tsarist expansionism.
7  In postwar Russian historiography several authors continued to follow this theme. Thus,
S. G. Fedorova wrote in her monograph:
Studying  the  politics  of  the  Tsarist  government  in  the  years  preceding  the
formation of the Russian-American Company, the Soviet historian S. B. Okun’, and
following him N. N. Bolkhovitinov, noted that primary in these politics in this case
was not the granting of monopolistic advantages to any particular company, even
such  a  strong  company  as  Shelikhov’s,  but  the  striving  to  create  under  direct
control of the government a powerful monopolistic unity for successful resistance
to foreign expansion and firm possession of northwestern America.10
8 Academician N. N. Bolkhovitinov, being then initially an adherent to the views of S. B.
Okun’,11 changed his point of view over time and began to assert that the expansionism of
Tsarism in the Pacific region had been substantially exaggerated.12 In one of his recent
works, Bolkhovitinov touched upon this theme:
Meanwhile,  Okun’s  assertion  that  the  Tsarist  government  had  a  carefully
considered  plan  of  establishing  the  supremacy  of  Russia  in  the  North  Pacific,
including  the  Hawaiian  Islands  and California,  had no documentary  support.  In
contrast, the documents that came from the government limited and suppressed
attempts at excessive expansion of Russian influence in the Pacific basin, which was
shown in particular in the rejection in 1818–1819 of the request of the “owner of
the  Sandwich  Islands”—Kaumuali‘i—regarding  his  admission  into  Russian
citizenship and of the skeptical relationship to the projects of P. V. Dobell regarding
the  trade  connections  of  Kamchatka  and Russian  America  with  the  Philippines,
California, Canton, and others.13 
9 N. N. Bolkhovitinov’s student, A. Yu. Petrov, also observes that on the basis of available
published and archival documents no weighty or direct evidence of the presence in the
government of a grandiose plan of expansion is found.14 The Ekaterinburg researcher E.
V. Alekseeva, with reference to A. Yu. Petrov, also reports on this.15
10  Other authors also give priority, in the expansion of Russia into the North Pacific, not to
the Tsarist government but to Shelikhov, Baranov, Rezanov, and Zavalishin. Alekseeva
wrote in her book about the unrealized projects to transform the Northern part of the
Pacific Ocean into an inland sea of Russia, something that the “not indifferent Russian
strategists”  G.  I.  Shelikhov  and  D.  I.  Zavalishin  supported.16 The  St.  Petersburg
Americanist  V.  V.  Noskov states  that  in  1806  Rezanov proposed a  concrete  plan for
Russia’s establishment on both shores of the Pacific Ocean as a future flowering of the
Russian Empire.17 The Moscow historian A. V. Postnikov holds in his monograph a similar
view: “N. P. Rezanov tried in every way to bring to life the idea, proposed by Grigorii
Shelikhov, of advancing the boundaries of the Russian colonies to the south (along the
North American coast — A.G) as far as the fortieth parallel.”18 Foreign specialists also
usually agree with such points of view, identifying Rezanov as the chief elaborator of the
expansionist projects, and Shelikhov and Baranov as the “builders of the empire” on the
Pacific coast of America.19
11  Thus, a survey of the scholarly literature vividly demonstrates the absence of unity in
Russian and foreign historiography in relation to the key questions of Russian expansion
in the New World. Some scholars ascribe expansionistic plans in the North Pacific to
government circles; others generally deny the presence of Tsarism in such projects; still
others  suppose  that  such  plans  were  worked  out  by  private  individuals,  especially
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representatives of the RAC. The chronology of the origin of such projects and their final
downfall remains unclear.
III. Retracing Early Steps
12  In order to grasp all  these questions,  we turn to the documents and begin with the
sources of Russian expansion in the Pacific Ocean and North America. As the sources
attest, Peter I had already initiated the organized movement of Russians to the east of
Kamchatka and Chukotka:  on December 23,  1724,  he gave a  decree to the Admiralty
College regarding the organization of the First Kamchatka Expedition. Two weeks later
Captain V. I. Bering, assigned as the main leader, received an imperial instruction to build
two boats with decks in Kamchatka and that they be sent along the shore of the land
“which goes to the nord”
20
 (evidently America); then to investigate the region where it
“met” Asia, and after this to go to the nearest city of any of the European powers in the
New World.21 In other words,  the captain was to simultaneously execute at least two
incompatible tasks: first, to examine the region of the strait between the mainland just
south of the Arctic Circle and second, to reach European possessions on the west coast of
America,  the  closest  of  which  were  located  far  to  the  south—in  the  territory  of
contemporary Mexico.
13  Understandably, Bering did not completely fulfill the instructions of the Emperor. In
1728 he only just passed the strait between America and Asia in the boat Sv. Gavriil, and
was not able to identify it because of the fog, nor to find the shores of the American
mainland. Inasmuch as Bering did not carry out the task entrusted to him, he was sent
once more to the Far East as head of the Second Kamchatka Expedition. In a decree of
December 28, 1732, the Senate ordered the members of the new expedition to once again
set off to the region of the Chukchi Peninsula and to finally clear up the question of the
strait between Asia and America. Peaceful relations were to be deliberately maintained
with the local population, inviting them to adopt Russian citizenship and to pay yasak
(tribute of  furs) on a voluntary basis.  A separate task of  Commander Bering and his
assistant Captain A. I. Chirikov was to search the “American shores,” using two packet
boats built in Kamchatka, “with extreme diligence and care.” Finally, the Senate ordered
a member of the expedition—Captain M. P. Shpanberg—to go with another boat and two
dubel boats,
22
 also built in Kamchatka, and study the Kurile Islands and the coast of Japan.
23
14  On the whole, three vectors were marked for Russian expansion in the Pacific Ocean: the
northern vector—the region of the Bering Strait; the eastern—to the shores of America;
and the southern—in the direction of Japan. This second expedition had political as well
as scientific goals in mind. It was no accident that precisely during preparations for this
expedition that the first more or less detailed plans for a vast Russian colonial expansion
in the Pacific basin emerged. Its author was over-secretary of the Senate I. K. Kirilov, who
composed  a  remarkable  report  in  1733  which  directly  discussed  the  necessity  to
investigate the American shore to 45° n. lat. and to advance from Kamchatka to Japan in
the  western  part  of  the  Pacific  Ocean.  As  a  special  point,  members  of  the  Bering
expedition  were  ordered  “to  find  everywhere  new  lands  and  islands  and  to  bring
nonsubject peoples as much as possible into citizenship.”24 Kirilov especially stipulated
the possibility of joining the American lands in California and Mexico to the possessions
of the empire, and as a possible counteraction to the intrigues of the Spanish he proposed
using the hatred of the local Indian tribes toward them. Expansion on the American coast,
in the opinion of the prominent statesman, would contribute to reinforcing the treasury
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and  the  development  of  Russian  trade  in  the  Pacific.  Thus,  Kirilov’s  report  vividly
demonstrates that already by the beginning of the 1730s a project of broad expansion in
the Pacific basin existed in government circles,  including even the land of California.
Therefore,  one  cannot  agree  with  the  assertions  that  such  plans  by  the  Tsarist
government  did  not  exist.  We  note  that  they  were  worked  out  long  before  similar
proposals by G. I. Shelikhov, which researchers at times relate.25
15  The history of the Second Kamchatka Expedition is sufficiently well known. During the
course  of  this  expedition  Russian  mariners  on  the  packet  boat  Sv.  Pavel,  under  the
command of A. I. Chirikov, succeeded for the first time in arriving, on July 15, 1741, on the
shores of America at 55° n. lat. This location was for a long time the southern boundary of
the official Russian claim in the New World. After the discovery of the shores of Southeast
Alaska, Chirikov went north to the Kenai Peninsula and Kodiak Island, and on return to
Petropavlovsk-Kamchatski discovered several of the Aleutian Islands. The head of the
expedition, V. I. Bering in the packet boat Sv. Petr, landed at Kayak Island (58° n. lat.) not
far  from the  mainland  at  Cape  St.  Elias  one  day  later  than  Chirikov.  After  that  he
immediately set off for Kamchatka, discovering along the way the Shumagin Islands and
several islands in the Aleutian chain before reaching the Commander Islands, where the
packet  boat  suffered  shipwreck  and  the  commander  himself  died  from  scurvy  in
December 1741. It was not until August 1742 that the surviving members of the crew of
Bering’s  packet  boat  succeeded  in  building  a  new  boat,  in  which  they  returned  to
Petropavlovsk.  In  September  1743,  the  Second  Kamchatka  Expedition  was  officially
concluded. The Tsarist government was not satisfied with its results because of the huge
expenses in carrying out the geographical investigations without sufficient economic and
political returns. In just organizing and equipping the Second Kamchatka Expedition the
treasury had paid out since 1733 the gigantic sum of 360,659 rubles.26 The government
was not satisfied with the scant information about lands discovered in the New World,
which also had not  been very earnestly  studied.  Members  of  the expedition did not
succeed  in  discovering  mineral  deposits  or  raw  materials,  or  introducing  Russian
citizenship to the local population. Moreover, a third of the members of the expedition
(including its leader) did not return from the trip to the shores of America, while one of
the packet boats perished and much government equipment was lost.
IV. A Shift in Direction
16  Not surprisingly, with the termination of the Second Kamchatka Expedition the central
government  lost interest  in  organizing new expeditions  to  the  islands  in  the  Pacific
Ocean,  handing  over  the  initiative  to  private  individuals—primarily  to  Siberian
merchants, who had to provide their own capital and expense for the interests of the
empire on its eastern borders. Beginning in 1743, ships equipped by Siberian merchants
with crews of Russian promyshlenniki set off for the Commander and Aleutian Islands,
which  had  been  discovered  by  members  of  the  Bering-Chirikov  expedition.  The
promyshlenniki collected valuable furs and subdued the local Aleuts,
27
 compelling them
to pay yasak to the Tsarist treasury and to furnish furs for the merchant companies.
17  At the beginning of the 1760s the government’s attention was again attracted to the
North Pacific when mariner S. G. Glotov, who wintered over three years in the Fox Island
chain, returned in 1762 to Nizhnekamchatsk and reported to the Kamchatka authorities
that he had heard from local Aleuts about an enigmatic “Shugachtany” people, who lived
to the east and supposedly had mirrors, broadswords, and ink pots. He also delivered
news about the find on Chikhmil Island of a foreign two-masted ship stranded on the
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shore.28 The  appearance  of  the  first  signs  of  a  foreign presence  at  the  most  distant
borders of the empire could not but alert the government. Empress Catherine II, in a
decree of May 4, 1764, commanded the Admiralty College to immediately send several
naval officers for a more detailed study of the region,29 and in March 1766 an official
decree appeared on the annexation to Russia of six Aleutian Islands.30 In the same year
the commandant  of  Okhotsk,  F.  Kh.  Plenisner,  recommended annexing to  Russia  the
territory of the New World from California “to the highest regions of North America,”31
that is, no more and no less than all the west coast of the present United States and
Canada.  However,  the  highly  optimistic  plans  of  the Okhotsk  commandant  were  not
brought to life. Instead a new government expedition led by captains P. K. Krenitsyn and
M. D. Levashov, which lasted from 1764 to 1771, cost the treasury enormous resources
and great human sacrifices, and did not bring the desired results,32 which again forced
the government to withdraw from participation in any expansionistic projects in the
North Pacific for almost 15 years.
V. A Feverish Pace, an Aggressive Stance
18  The next time the Tsarist government turned attention to this region was after obtaining
reports  from Kamchatka and the Aleutian Islands of  the arrival  there of  the English
expedition of the famous captain James Cook, who in 1778 visited the shores of Southeast
Alaska,  the  Kenai  Peninsula,  Kodiak  Island,  Unalaska  Island  (where  he  encountered
Russian promyshlenniki), the region of Bristol Bay, and Bering Strait; in addition, Cook’s
ships twice visited Petropavlovsk in Kamchatka. Cook’s visit to the North Pacific brought
alarm to the Tsarist authorities concerning the situation in the “back yard” of the Russian
Empire. It was urgently ordered that the priority of Russian discoveries in this region be
confirmed: By 1780 feverish work had begun in the Admiralty College and the Academy of
Sciences  on  composing  geographic  maps,  which  would  reflect  the  results  of  the
expeditions of Russian mariners.33 In 1784, by the initiative of academician P. S. Pallas, the
idea of sending to this region a new official expedition emerged in government circles, as
seen in the invitation to join Russian service in this same year of one of the members of
Cook’s  voyage—midshipman  Joseph  Billings.  The  formation  of  his  expedition  was
accelerated by the dispatch of French ships under the command of La Pérouse to the
North  Pacific.34 The  new  governmental  Northeast  Geographic  and  Astronomical
Expedition of J. J. Billings and G. A. Sarychev was officially organized in August 1785 after
a  decree  by  Catherine  II  to  the  Admiralty  College.  Her  main  goal  was  the  detailed
investigation and formal strengthening of the Russian crown in Chukotka. A second goal
was the study of the islands lying close to the Alaska Peninsula as far as Cape St. Elias,
which had been discovered by V. I. Bering in 1741. In addition, Billings was ordered to
“try to confer the Russian scepter” upon the local population, if not yet subject to any
other European power. Finally, if the occasion arose he was encouraged to describe the
Kurile Islands as far as Japan, China, and Korea.35 On the whole, the Billings expedition
(1785–1795) bore more of a reconnaissance and scientific character than political, and less
the military one that some historians occasionally assert.36
19  Parallel  with  the  Billings  expedition,  a  project  was  elaborated  within  the  Tsarist
government to send a large-scale expedition of the Russian naval fleet from Kronstadt to
the Pacific Ocean. The proposal to send two frigates and a military transport to the Pacific
from the Baltic with the goal of training experienced mariners, expanding commerce, and
founding fortifications in America was first expressed as early as 1732 by the inspector
general  of  the  fleet  Count  N.  F.  Golovin  at  the  time  of  Bering’s  Second  Kamchatka
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Expedition.37 However, Golovin’s project was not sanctioned by the throne. Another such
proposition by the Empress’s Secretary of State, P. A. Soimonov, appeared in December
1786.38 Soimonov substantiated the urgency of sending a Russian squadron to the Pacific
by pointing to the growing activity of the English in the North Pacific and the expense of
construction of naval ships at local sites. The president of the Department of Commerce,
A. R. Vorontsov, and a member of the Office of Foreign Affairs, Count A. A. Bezborodko,
entirely supported Soimonov’s project in a joint message to Catherine II, which discussed
the claims of Russia to all the northwestern coast of America to 55° n. lat. and the whole
Aleutian and Kurile chain by right of first discovery of these lands and islands by Russian
mariners. Foreign governments should be notified of the inadmissibility of their subjects’
ships appearing on Russian shores to conduct trade with the local inhabitants. To secure
these demands two warships were to be sent from the Baltic to the Pacific, and the coats
of arms of the Russian Empire would be displayed on the coast of Alaska and adjacent
islands.39
20  On the advice of her councillors, the Empress gave instructions to the Office of Foreign
Affairs at the end of December 1786 to notify European powers of the rights of Russia to
the lands discovered by its mariners, and ordered four warships sent to the Pacific.40 At
the end of April 1787, Captain of 1st Rank G. I. Mulovskii was assigned to command the
future  Pacific  squadron,  having  received  detailed  instructions  from  the  Admiralty
College.41 Mulovskii’s squadron (four small warships and a transport carrying supplies)
was expected to go from Kronstadt around the Cape of Good Hope, and then cross the
Indian Ocean and pass through Sunda Strait into the Pacific. Here, on the shores of Japan,
two  vessels  were  supposed  to  begin  a  detailed  inventory  of  the  Kurile  Islands  and
officially secure them for Russia, and then examine the mouth of the Amur River and
Sakhalin Island. At the same time, Mulovskii was to continue the voyage to Kamchatka
with the remaining ships, and from there move on to the shores of the New World in the
region of 40–50° n. lat. Later, he was to go along the coast to the north, to visit Nootka
Sound on the west side of Vancouver Island (49° 35' n. lat.). All land north of 55° n. lat.
was  considered (since its  discovery by Captain Chirikov)  as  belonging to Russia,  and
Mulovskii was to “tear down, level, and destroy” coats of arms and signs of other powers
discovered there. Southwards from that point Mulovskii was to “take into the possession
of  the  Russian  state,  if  no  other  power  occupied  it.”  With  favorable  circumstances
Mulovskii was to extend the possessions of the empire in America to 43° n. lat. and even
farther south,42 that is, to occupy all of California. For formal seizure of the American
coast he was to raise Russian flags on high places, to erect state coats of arms, and to
distribute to the natives specially cast medals.
V. Dreams Crushed by the Weight of Wars
21  Thus, a broad plan of colonial expansion was outlined, including a clear military-political
aspect, which in fact reanimated the project of I. K. Kirilov of 1733. In the event that it
was realized, Russia would make a serious claim to converting the northern part of the
Pacific  Ocean  into  the  “Russian  Sea.”  However,  these  plans  were  not  realized:  the
beginning  of  the  Russian-Turkish  and  then  the  Russian-Swedish  war  forced  the
abandonment of the Mulovskii expedition (he was himself redirected to the Baltic, where
he  heroically  perished  in  the  battle  of  Öland  in  1789).  The  French  Revolution  and
subsequent upheavals in European politics completely moved the question of Russians
colonialism in the New World to the background, at least for St. Petersburg.
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22  Almost simultaneous with the government’s expansionist plans concerning the North
Pacific, a similar project was proposed by the Ryl’sk merchant G. I. Shelikhov. Shelikhov,
in instructions of May 4, 1786 to the director of his company on Kodiak Island, K. A.
Samoilov, called for the settlement of artels (groups or brigades) of promyshlenniki along
American lands to 40° n. lat.43 In his reports to the Irkutsk governor-general in April 1787,
Shelikhov emphasized in every way his unselfishness “for the benefit of the fatherland”
and  formulated  tasks  for  later  colonization  of  America.  “And  what  is  more,”  wrote
Shelikhov, “I tried to go as far as possible to the south along America to the shore lying at
California with occupation by Russian settlements and leaving our signs to avert those
who might think of making attempts on this part of the land for other nations, to make
our  acquisitions  first.”44 Later,  patriotism  and  external  threats  became  favorite
argumentative devices to justify expansion both for G. I. Shelikhov personally and for the
RAC as a whole.
23  Shelikhov’s proposals were completely supported by the Irkutsk governor-general, I. V.
Yakobi, who was an active advocate of expansion, the more so since as a result of the
activity of the “Shelikhov” company new vast and rich territories fell under his authority.
45
 Therefore,  in November 1787 he sent a report to Empress Catherine II,  which also
reflected a worry for the future of Russian possessions in the Pacific in connection with
the  active  penetration of  foreign mariners  and traders  onto  the  Northwest  Coast  of
America following the voyage of  James Cook.  In order to secure these territories for
Russia, Yakobi ordered 30 copper Russian coats of arms prepared and the same number of
iron plates with the inscription Zemlya rossiiskogo vladeniya (Land of Russian Possession),
part of which was handed over to Shelikhov. The people of his company were to set up
the coats of arms in the most visible places on the coast beginning at 44° n. lat., while the
plates were to be buried in the ground nearby as evidence that the land belonged to the
empire. This claiming of territory also was to be done in the Kurile Islands. In addition,
for securing Russian claims, Yakobi recommended sending to the Pacific several warships
and building fortresses on the American coast as far south as possible, at least to 47° n.
lat. “if farther is not possible.”46 Thus, Yakobi, on behalf of the Siberian administration,
supported the plan of turning the North Pacific into the “Russian Sea.”
24  The report of the Irkutsk governor-general and the petition of G. I. Shelikhov and his
companion I. I. Golikov about the development of trade in the Pacific and the intention of
founding new colonies on the Northwest Coast of America and the Kuriles received a
favorable  response  from  the  Tsarist  government.47 However,  in  March  1788  the
Committee  on  Commerce,  regarding  voyages  and  trade  in  the  Pacific  Ocean,
recommended limiting Russians possessions to 55° n. lat., “about where Captain Chirikov
had encountered the American mainland in 1741,” because of the threat of a clash with
the English in America.48 Catherine II herself generally rejected the petitions of the high
governmental authorities and the solicitations of privileges by the zealous merchants,
noting: “Much spread in the Pacific Sea will  not bring positive benefits.  Trade is one
thing, seizure is another.”49 As historian N. N. Bolkhovitinov has convincingly indicated,
the rejection by the Empress of colonial expansion at this time was also dictated by other
things, such as wars with the Turks and Swedes. During the second half of the eighteenth
and first half of the nineteenth centuries the primary direction of Russian expansion was
south (the northern Black Sea area—the Caucasus), which was directly reflected in the
utterances of the Tsaritsa during this period. Also the all-powerful favorite Duke G. A.
Potemkin was lobbying for a “southern direction.” In addition, the Empress did not trust
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swindling Siberian merchants and feared a future desertion of the Russian colonies from
the old country based on the example of the United States, which had just liberated itself
from the authority of Great Britain. Finally, she did not wish additional complications
with other powers in the Pacific—the problems of European politics fully occupied her.50
25  As we see, in only one year the plans of the Tsarist government regarding expansion in
the Pacific basin radically changed: if Mulovskii was ordered in 1787 to consolidate the
rights of the empire from the shores of Japan to California,  it  was followed by a full
rejection  of  the  new  acquisitions  in  the  east  followed  in  1788.  After  Catherine  II’s
resolution, Count A. A. Bezborodko wrote in September 1788 to Procurator General of the
Senate, A. A. Vyazemskii,  that it was necessary to “strongly declare in general to the
promyshlenniki, concerning the Kurile Islands, to not engage in disputes with the Chinese
about possession and likewise not to touch the islands that were in possession of other
powers.”51
26  And later, while Russia was involved in numerous coalitions and wars in Europe and in
the Caucasus at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries, the
government did not wish additional foreign political complications on the far-eastern
boundaries of the empire. From this moment the initiative in elaborating expansionist
plans in the North Pacific finally moved to representatives of merchant capital, who were
vitally  interested  in  occupying  new resource  areas  because  of  the  exhaustion  of  fur
wealth in the former territories. In February 1790, Shelikhov reported to the new Irkutsk
Governor General, I. A. Pil’: “Along the mainland of America from the island of Kaktak
[Kodiak] to California, far beyond Cape St. Elias, in many places through the means and
expense of the company, at my instruction, imperial signs were distributed and left, the
essence of which is the coat of arms and plates with the inscription: land belonging to
Russia.”52 In addition, Shelikhov planned to begin trade and to subject the tribes north
from the Alaska Peninsula to the mouth of the Yukon River and farther to Bering Strait to
the Russian scepter. He succeeded in this same year in engaging a new director for his
company in America—the Kargopol merchant, A. A. Baranov—who completely shared the
views of his patron in spreading in every possible way the possessions of the empire in
the New World.
VI. Competition Runs Fierce
27  Pil’,  like  his  predecessor  I.  V.  Yakobi,  did  not  give  up  hope  of  helping  Shelikhov’s
company to eventually advance south along the American coast to California and along
the Kurile Islands to Japan,  which he reported to Catherine II  in 1790.  He especially
directed the attention of the Empress to the English and Spanish—the chief competitors
of the Russians during this period—who now carried out voyages to the shores of Russian
America more often.53 Later, in a report of Septembebr 28, 1793, Pil’ again turned the
attention of the government to the need to support Shelikhov’s company.54 On the other
hand, in a letter of August 9, 1794 to A. A. Baranov, Shelikhov wrote about his organizing
a special North American company that would spread its operations to the north from
Unalaska Island to Bering Strait, as well as establishing a colony on the Kurile Island of
Urup.55 Later, the primary burden for the expansion of Russian possessions in America lay
entirely  with  Baranov,  since  Shelikhov  unexpectedly  died  in  Irkutsk  in  July  1795.
Baranov’s dream was to spread Russian colonies from Alaska along the American coast to
Nootka Sound on the west coast of Vancouver Island.56 
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28  In a letter of June 10, 1798, Baranov outlined a detailed plan for founding new colonies in
the region of  Southeast Alaska.57 And in a letter of  July 24,  1800,  to the head of  the
Unalaska office, E. G. Larionov, he wrote:
And with this it may be that our high court will also follow with reinforcement and
defense  of  our  hunting  and  trade  from  being  undermined  by  new  arrivals
(foreigners – A.G.), and this is very necessary at the present time, since Nootka is
not yet occupied by the English and the courts of the Gishpanskii [Spanish] and
Aglitskii [English], and the American Republic are occupied by war with France and
other ministerial (diplomatic – A.G.) affairs; the advantages of those places are so
important since they ensure the future gains of millions for the government.58
29  However, the spread of Russian possessions in America was accompanied by incredible
difficulties: Baranov struggled with dangerous competitors represented by the company
of P. S. Lebedev-Lastochkin (until 1798) and foreign businessmen. He fought the sabotage
of his own promyshlenniki and sailors, encountered hostile relations with natives, and
dealt with insufficient necessary goods and materials and lack of personnel. In 1799 the
ship Feniks,  on which 70 promyshlenniki  reinforcements and goods valued at  569,328
rubles were being sent to Baranov from Okhotsk, was wrecked.59 But these setbacks did
not retard the process of the Russian colonization of America. In 1799 Baranov succeeded
in founding on Sitka Island (57° n. lat.) the Mikhailovskaya (Arkhangel’skaya) fortress,
while  in  Russia  the  final  formation  of  the  monopolistic  Russian-American  Company
occurred, created by the union of several merchant organizations under the aegis of the
government. The RAC’s region of operation was defined as stretching along the American
shore from 55° n. lat. to the Bering Strait and the Aleutian and Kurile Islands (to the
island of Iturup). It especially stipulated the possibility of “making new discoveries not
only above 55° north latitude, but also some farther to the south and occupying lands
discovered by it [the RAC] for Russian possession ... if they are not occupied by any other
(European – A.G.) peoples and are not subject to them.”60
30  Having in fact obtained carte blanche expansion in the New World, the RAC selected its
chief direction as south, which was dictated by several circumstances. First, the sea otter
did not live north of the Alaska Peninsula—the main commercial object hunted by the
company—whereas it was plentiful to the south from Kodiak to California. Second, the
RAC strove to outstrip foreign competitors in the struggle for new territories and hunting
grounds.  Third,  company management pursued the hope of developing agriculture in
America to provide a dependable supply base for the Russian colonies. By fall 1801 the
board of directors of the RAC reported to the Emperor that A. A. Baranov “meanwhile
arranges  to  add to the possession of  Russia  the Queen Charlotte  Islands and Nootka
Sound, which the English have now left.”61
31  In a secret “instruction” to Baranov in April 1802 the directors of the RAC wrote: “The
board of directors commissions you to try to assert the right of Russia not only to the 55th
degree, but even farther, supported by the maritime voyages of Captains Bering, Chirikov,
and others.” The instruction added:
Strive even with this to display some right also in Nootka Sound itself, in order that
for the demands that might come from the English court it will be possible in some
way to determine the boundaries at 50th degree or at least at half the distance to 55
th degree, if farther is not possible, because that part is not yet occupied by them,
and, consequently, at this time Russia has the primary right to it, and toward this
you are to try to assert by settlements at the 55th degree as forcefully and quickly as
possible, with completion of a regular fortress, as far as the people you now have
are sufficient .... And for better success in those places it is suggested at the present
The Plans for Russian Expansion in the New World and the North Pacific in the...
European journal of American studies, 5-2 | 2010
11
time to stop all investigations toward the north and to turn attention to that part
when we strengthen our establishment with the English in the neighborhood.62
32  At the same time the directors reported to Emperor Alexander I that should Baranov
“receive the necessary reinforcements, he will intend to occupy not only the closest lying
Queen Charlotte Islands but spread the Russian acquisitions farther.”63
33  However,  the active expansionist  striving of  the RAC encountered opposition in the
Tsarist government, which given the complex situation in Europe did not want additional
complications in America. This was directly discussed in the instructions of July 10, 1803,
by the Minister of Commerce, Count N. P. Rumyantsev, to the correspondent of the RAC,
N. P. Rezanov, before the dispatch of the latter to the Russian colonies:
In the reasoning of the membership of the Russian Empire you have as a boundary
the recent discovery, made in 1741 by Captain Chirikov, known as the 55th degree of
north latitude. Give the director of America the order that he by no means spread
farther from this place any Russians beyond boundaries being occupied by other
maritime  powers.  Bring  home  to  them  that  this  should  be  the  more  piously
observed, that through this all trouble will be removed forever from the maritime
powers  allied  with  us,  and  that  the  company,  being  limited  to  acquisitions
indisputably belonging to Russia ... in this way will more quickly attain the their
respect and general trust.64
34  In addition, Rumyantsev ordered the correspondent of the RAC to avoid in every way,
upon  encountering  foreigners,  any  talk  “about  the  boundaries  of  our  American
settlements.”
35  For his part, N. P. Rezanov was exhorted to repeat the basic order of Rumyantsev to the
governor of Russian America, A. A. Baranov, in the instruction of January 12, 1804, where
he appealed to “confirm resolutely our property to 55 degrees north latitude, taking this
as the rule and for future plans in America not to embrace its spread farther on the
shores,  but  to  strive  gradually  to  penetrate  into  the  interior  of  the  mainland.”65
Consequently, Rezanov tried to redirect the point of Russian expansion from a southern
direction  to  an  eastern  and  northern  one.  Arriving  in  Alaska  in  1805,  he  offered  a
proposal to the directors of the RAC to significantly strengthen the colonial flotilla with
armed ships and with their aid to expel from the Northwest Coast American maritime
traders who had been buying up the valuable furs from the local Indians and selling them
firearms, which they then used against the Russians. In a letter of February 15, 1806, to
the Emperor,  Rezanov reported to  him the intention of  expelling the Japanese from
Sakhalin Island and compelling them to enter into trade relations with the RAC.66 For this,
he sent two RAC ships from Alaska in the summer of this same year, the crews of which
destroyed several Japanese villages in the southern Kuriles and Sakhalin and sank four
Japanese junks in 1807–1808,67 blocking for a long time any friendly contact between
Japan and Russia.
VII. Striving to Make Inroads
36  The diversion of relatively substantial forces to the “Japanese” expedition had a very
negative effect on the Russian colonization of America, though plans of strengthening the
colonization effort especially occupied the thoughts of N. P. Rezanov. Finding himself in
Alaska, he elaborated the project of broad expansion, presenting a detailed program of
colonial seizures in the New World. Although a government official of high rank, in this
case he emerged rather as a representative of the RAC inasmuch as he was the informal
head of the company and representative of its interests before the throne. In a letter of
February 15, 1806, to the directors of the RAC, Rezanov wrote from Novo-Arkhangel’sk:
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“If we have the possibility of making a settlement on the Columbia River, it will be a
central place from which to easily seize the island of Kaigani (Prince of Wales and Dall
Island — A.G.) and settle on it, and to construct shipyards opposite the Queen Charlotte
Islands.”  Being  based  at  Novo-Arkhangel’sk,  at  Kaigani,  and  at  a  settlement  on  the
Columbia River, and having warships constructed, Rezanov planned to seize all the fur
trade  on  the  Northwest  Coast.  From  the  Columbia  river  he  intended  to  spread  the
influence of the Russians as far south as San Francisco Bay in California: “If means are
given to them at the very beginning, then I could boldly say that we will attract to the
Columbia  residents  from various  places,  and in  the  course  of  ten  years  it  would  be
possible to be strengthened to that stage, that with the least occurrence of fortune in
favor of our political circumstances in Europe, it could be included in the number of
Russian possessions.”68
37  Especially attractive to the enterprising chamberlain was the bountiful California: “The
Gishpanskii [Spanish] people are very weak in this region and if in 1798, when war was
declared on the Gishpanskii court, our company had been found in forces corresponding
to its  activity,  then the part  of  California to 34° north latitude to the mission Santa
Barbara could easily be used and a piece of this could always be held for ourselves, since
from Mexico, due to natural conditions, any aid by a land route would be impossible for
them.”69
38  Rezanov also developed his  ideas  in a  dispatch of  June 17,  1806,  to the Minister  of
Commerce:
If earlier the Government thought about this part of the world, if it considered it as
sufficient, if it uninterruptedly followed the insightful visions of Peter the Great
who outlined the Bering expedition with small means for that time, then it can be
affirmatively  said  that  New  California  never  would  have  belonged  to  the
Gishpanskii, for it was only from 1760 that they turned their attention and with the
undertaking  of  some  missionaries  consolidated  this  best  piece  of  land  for
themselves forever. Now no occupied interval still remains that is equally profitable
and  is  very  necessary  to  us  (sic),  and  so  if  we  let  it  pass,  then  what  will  our
descendants say?70
39 However, Rezanov, due to an early death, was prevented from bringing to life plans for a
substantial increase in the possessions of the empire in America. He died in Krasnoyarsk
of  pneumonia en route to St.  Petersburg on March 1(13),  1807.
71
 With the demise of
Rezanov, the RAC was compelled to set aside the plans of broad colonial expansion in
America.  As  the  eminent  Russian  mariner  V.  M.  Golovnin  wrote  later,  not  without
sarcasm: “With the death of Mr. Rezanov all hope of great undertakings by the great
company ended,  the directors,  being from merchants  ...,  gravitated away from great
ideas, as Rezanov called his dreams, to the usual merchant speculations.”72
40  On the other hand, the directors of the RAC tried to colonize Sakhalin and in August 1808
secured approval from the throne for colonization of the island,73 but the plan remained
unrealized. During this period the company fell into a serious financial crisis. It lacked
the strength, means, and personnel for large-scale colonial seizures. In America A. A.
Baranov was not able to push Russian colonies south of Novo-Arkhangel’sk. In a report to
the Emperor of August 20, 1808, the directors of the RAC reported:
Because of the insufficiency of time and opportunity, and most of all an adequate
number of Russian workers, the Company has not yet spread in America farther to
the south beyond the mentioned occupation;  though more than 600 people  are
found there,  they are all  obliged to provide both for the island of Sitka and all
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occupied land lying behind it along the islands and mainland shore. As soon as time
and  possibility  contribute,  the  company  business  will  advance  into  the  Queen
Charlotte Islands, and farther toward the Columbia, if these lands and places do not
yet belong to any European peoples.74
41  Baranov  acted  rather  carefully.  He  had  neither  the  sanction  of  St.  Petersburg  for
independent seizure of the territory south of the 55th parallel nor sufficient forces for the
realization of huge expanionist plans. Therefore, in 1808 he directed his closest assistant,
I. A. Kuskov, to carry out only reconnaissance in the regions of the Strait of Juan de Fuca,
the mouth of the Columbia River, and California. Regarding negotiations with foreigners,
Kuskov was instructed “not to enter into any discussion about the awarding of rights in
the local seizures there.”75 Under favorable conditions Kuskov was supposed to establish a
small  outpost  in the territories  examined.  However,  Baranov clarified that  “it  is  not
necessary to establish vast replacements with buildings in the first and present case, until
all this shore from Californian San Francisco harbor to the Strait of de Fuca is entirely
explored and we receive formal permission from our government for occupation and
settlement there.”76
42  In contrast,  the government was clear during this period about not making colonial
seizures in the Pacific. When Lieutenant L. A. Hagemeister, who was on an RAC ship in
1808, visited the Hawaiian Islands and carried out rather successful negotiations with the
local king, Kamehameha I, for a colony of Russians on one of the islands,77 the prospects
of consolidating a position in Hawaii did not entirely inspire official St. Petersburg.
43  Under these conditions the RAC was forced to act independently while the government
remained passive. Also, negotiations between St. Petersburg and Washington in 1809–
1811 were not successful concerning the limitation of trade of American entrepreneurs
with the Indians of Southeast Alaska, which was within the sphere of Russian influence.78
Tsarist diplomacy not only lacked a clear idea of the boundaries of its possessions in
America, but also did not assert its governmental interests or the rights of the RAC there.
However,  in summer 1810,  N.  P.  Rumyantsev,  upon an encounter with the American
envoy J. K. Adams, mentioned that the Russian maps included all the coast from Nootka
Sound to the Columbia River among Russian possessions. However, the chancellor later
acknowledged directly to the American diplomat that he himself and the Emperor did not
attach great significance to the question of contraband trade by citizens of the United
States; further, it was advisable to lay aside the question of the boundary on the west
coast of America to a later time “in order to avoid possible clashes.”79
44  Meanwhile,  events  moved rapidly.  In 1811,  Americans established an outpost  at  the
mouth of the Columbia River, which at one stroke sharply limited the potential claims of
the RAC on the Northwest Coast. And though in the following year, based on the initiative
of the company, the Russians established a fortified settlement (Fort Ross) in California
north of San Francisco, the scheme for complete control over the whole American coast
was by then given up for lost. Founding Fort Ross on lands that the Spanish claimed led to
diplomatic friction with the Spanish crown,80 and later with authorities in Mexico. In this
connection, S. B. Okun’’s assertions that the Tsarist government at the end of the decade
1800–1810 allegedly prepared to seize Spanish colonies in America under the “cloak” of
the  RAC  appear  unconvincing.81 Neither  the  Tsarist  government  nor  the  company
planned seizure of the Spanish colonies; the RAC only wished expansion of their own
possessions  in  California,  where  there  were  no  Spanish  settlements.  However,  the
establishment  of  Fort  Ross  was  not  a  success  for  the  company.  The  development of
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agriculture  there  for  supplying  goods  to  the  colonies  in  Alaska  was  pursued  by  an
insufficient work force, and the colony suffered from an economically and strategically
unfavorable location.
45  One attempt by representatives of the RAC to obtain one more agricultural outpost to
supply Alaska with goods was the so-called “adventure of Doctor Schaeffer.” In 1815–1817
a physician in the service of the RAC, G. A. Schaeffer, attempted at his own risk to join one
of the Hawaiian Islands to Russia, which N. N. Bolkhovitinov has described in detail.
82
 He
correctly criticized S. B. Okun’’s thesis83 of an alleged plan by the Tsarist government for
seizure of  Hawaii.  On the contrary,  as  the documents attest,  such an initiative came
almost wholly from Schaeffer himself, though partially from A. A. Baranov, who sent him
to Hawaii in 1815. With this, the governor of Russian America, under specific conditions,
did not exclude the annexation of the island of Kauai by armed means, but nevertheless
preferred to act with St. Petersburg in mind. The RAC board of directors at first reacted
very negatively to the plans of the ardent doctor, fearing international complications.
However, the board later tried to carefully support its employee, whereas Alexander I
himself and the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, K. V. Nessel’rode, categorically
rejected the idea of joining tropical islands to the empire in 1818.84 If the conservative
‘legitimism’ of the Tsar and the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is rejected as a
reason, then the real arguments against the annexation of Hawaii  were the lack of a
strong naval power in the Pacific and the insignificant trade fleet of Russia, as well as the
danger  of  provoking  the  discontent  of  England  and  the  United  States,  which  the
government sought to avoid for the sake of RAC interests. In these circumstances, when
the Russian consul in Manila, P. V. Dobell, came out in 1820 with a scheme for joining the
Hawaiian archipelago by means of an armed expedition, his plans did not arouse serious
attention of the Tsarist government.85
VIII Continuing Attempts in America
46  Having accomplished no success in Hawaii, the directors of the RAC nevertheless did not
give up hope of expanding Russian possessions in America, having “shifted” the boundary
on the shore to several degrees south of the 55th parallel. The board of directors of the
RAC tried to persuade the government of the incontestable right of the company to new
territories—not merely for the sake of acquisition or exaltation of the motherland, but for
obtaining as many potential hunting grounds as possible. The RAC quietly explored such
acquisition for several years before the formal expiration of its 20-year privileges in 1819.
In  a  special  memorandum of  December  23,  1816  (January  4,  1817),  the  head  of  the
company, clearly falsifying the facts, reported that the Russians were the first Europeans
to tread on the American shore from the Bering Strait to the mouth of the Columbia River
(46° n. lat.), that geographical expeditions from 1728 to 1785 “discovered and described
all the local places,” and that the number of baptized natives by 1806 “was considered
more than 20 thousand souls of both sexes.”86 From this came the logical conclusion that
all these lands were legally owned by the Russian Empire, which the RAC represented.
However, wishing to secure beforehand the support of the government in case of possible
complications, the authors of the “memorandum” pointed to the insignificant number of
Russians in America (a total of 400 men) and the contraband trade of the Americans, who
equipped the hostile Indians with guns.87
47  Around this  time the board of  directors issued a document with a predictable title:
“Regarding the right of Russians to possession of the Northwest Coast of America from
north latitude 50° to Icy Cape (70° 19’ n. lat. – A.G.) and to the supposed Polar Sea.” The
The Plans for Russian Expansion in the New World and the North Pacific in the...
European journal of American studies, 5-2 | 2010
15
author of the document rejected outright the discovery of the region by the Spanish and
Captain Cook, striving to substantiate the territorial claims of the RAC.88 As a result of
such  “historical  research”  the  company  concluded  the  legitimacy  of  the  southern
boundary of Russian possessions at 51° n. lat.89 In the scheme of the new privileges of the
RAC, presented to the government in spring 1819, the establishment of control by the
company over the coastal mainland from Bering Strait to 45° n. lat. was assumed, and
even  posts farther  south  if  these  territories  were  still  not  occupied  by  “European
nations.”90 In another document submitted to the government—“Memorandum on the
Trade of North Americans in the Russian Colonies in America”—claims were made to all
the Northwest Coast north from 46° n. lat.91 Thus, the company proposed to promote the
officially recognized boundary of Russian possessions in the New World 10 to 12 degrees
south to the mouth of the Columbia River.
48  The question of the delimitation of possessions in the New World was raised as early as
1816–1817 during diplomatic consultations between the leaders of Russia and the United
States  in connection with the founding of  the American colony at  the mouth of  the
Columbia River. With this, the claims of the American side initially did not extend north
of 49° n. lat.92 For its part the RAC strove to induce the Tsarist government to act on two
fronts in defense of its privileges: first, to organize diplomatic pressure in Washington for
the prohibition of trade by American citizens with natives of Russian America; second, to
guarantee  the  dispatch  of  naval  vessels  for  suppressing  the  contraband  trade  of
Americans in the waters of Southeast Alaska. With the goal of strengthening their claims,
the board of directors sent one complaint after another about the activity of foreign
traders in the possessions subordinate to the RAC. Thus, in a report to the Minister of
Internal  Affairs  of  October  31,  1819,  the  RAC  board  of  directors  referred  to  data
concerning this  question provided by the government inspector V.  M.  Golovnin.  The
latter sent the directors of the RAC a memorandum on September 10, 1819, about the
indisputable  right  of  Russia  to  the  Northwest  Coast  of  America,  and  recommended
securing the possessions of the company in California and appealing to the government
for support and protection of the privileges and colonies of the RAC.93 In his opinion
Russia had inalienable rights to the vital shores of America up to 51°n. lat.94
49  These memoranda and reports received on the whole a favorable response from the
Minister  of  Finance,  Count  D.  A.  Gur’ev,  who  supervised  the  RAC  in  the  Tsarist
government. Gur’ev felt that the southern boundary should have been the northern cape
of Vancouver Island at 51° n. lat., and even suggested that the boundary could have been
moved even farther south. However, this faced two problems—the proximity of American
colonies and the hostility of local Indians.95
50  Gur’ev’s views were taken into consideration in a new decree (“Rules”) of the RAC, signed
by the Tsar in September 1821. In the first section of the document were designated the
boundaries of the possessions of the RAC in America: from the coast of Bering Strait to 51°
n. lat., with the adjacent islands; and in Asia—the chain of the Kurile Islands to the island
of Urup, inclusive (45° 50' n. lat.). In these territories the company was granted exclusive
rights  to  hunting  and  trading.  The  Rules  of  1821  also  stipulated  the  possibility  of
expanding the possessions of the company to unoccupied lands.96 The conclusion to be
drawn is that the Tsarist government backed the RAC’s territorial claims, though rather
moderately: the southern boundary of Russian possessions was designated at 51°, and not
at 45–46° n. lat., as the company insisted. Yet even in this case the territorial appetites of
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St. Petersburg were clearly ambitious, since the southernmost Russian settlement (Novo-
Archangel’sk) was located at only 57° n. lat.
51  Besides expansion of the boundaries, a Tsarist decree of September 13, 1821, prohibited
foreign whalers and merchants conducting hunting and trade on all the Northwest Coast
of America from Bering Strait to 51° n. lat. and the whole coast of eastern Siberia: Foreign
ships, under threat of seizure (along with the cargo), did not have the right to approach
the designated shores of Russian possessions closer than 100 Italian miles.
97
 Commenting
on the September decree, D. I. Zavalishin wrote: “All this was interpreted by foreigners in
such a way that Russia would seize all foreign ships past the above-designated boundary,
though they did not approach the shore—such a claim of annexation of part of the ocean
was considered unheard of. In American and English newspapers individual declarations
even began to appear that force will be repelled by force.”98 These unilateral steps of the
Tsarist cabinet quickly brought on official protests from the United States and England,
and a little later served as a trigger for the well-known “Monroe doctrine.”99
IX Collapse of the “American Bridgehead”
52  By 1822 the Tsarist government was forced to retreat: the head of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Nessel’rode, ordered that the patrols of Russian warships should stay as close as
possible to the shores of Russian America and “not to stretch,” as was recorded in the
most recent privileges of the RAC, farther than 55° n. lat. to the south along the American
shore.100 In Russian America itself, rejection of trade with foreigners led to a sharp deficit
of many necessary wares and supplies since the RAC board of directors was not able to
regulate an effective supply of the colonies from the Baltic port of Kronstadt. By 1824 the
RAC had asked the government to permit trade with foreign entrepreneurs in Novo-
Arkhangel’sk.101 By this time the Tsarist cabinet had become completely disappointed
both in  the  politics  of  the  company and its  own rash steps  in  the  Pacific  arena.  In
response to unfounded claims to a substantial part of the Northwest Coast of America, the
government was forced in 1824–1825 to sign conventions with the United States and
Great Britain,102 which included considerable concessions. Foreigners were granted the
right to ten years free trade (with the exception of the sale of guns and spirituous drinks)
and hunting in the territorial waters of Russian America, and the Russian side had no
right to undertake any forcible action toward foreign ships. The conventions determined
the southern boundaries of the Russian colonies on the Northwest Coast of America at 54°
40' n. lat., and the eastern boundary—along the coastal range of mountains only 10 sea
miles from the shore to the 141st meridian, from where the boundary went north to the
shores of the Arctic Ocean. In addition, the English were granted the perpetual right to
freely sail on all rivers having a source in British possessions and that emptied into the
Pacific Ocean in the territory of Russian America. And inasmuch as in Southeast Alaska
the Russian-British boundary was installed along the coastal range only 10 miles from the
shore, this gave the English practically unlimited access to this region. What is more, the
largest river in Alaska—the Yukon—also had its source in Canada and therefore, by the
Convention of 1825, was perpetually open for English navigation. Representatives of the
RAC insisted in vain on creating the boundary in Southeast Alaska at 53° 40' n. lat. and
along the Rocky Mountains inland. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs represented
by Nessel’rode was inflexible on this point, and the Emperor did not wish to hear more
about any claims of the company in America.103
53  After signing the conventions, the Russians recognized that the only place in the New
World still open to Russian expansion was California. In November 1823 Midshipman D. I.
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Zavalishin, having just arrived in California aboard the frigate Kreiser, created a storm of
activity, striving to influence several local officials to proclaim the independence of this
Mexican province and make it a protectorate of Russia.  Zavalishin’s final goal was to
expel any citizens of the United States, to join northern California (from Bodega Bay to
42° n. lat.) to the empire, and to settle it with Russians. However, his plans, which have
been  analyzed  in  detail  by  Barratt,
104
 were  deflected  by  the  Tsarist  government  as
adventurist and bound to cause aggravated relations with England and the United States.
Likewise was the proposal of the representative of the RAC, Admiral N. S. Mordvinov, who
addressed himself  to the Minister of  Foreign Affairs,  Nessel’rode,  on January 8,  1824.
Mordvinov wrote of Fort Ross: “The boundary for this distant southern possession could
have been assigned from Bodega to 2 degrees to the north; in the depth of the land to the
east, to the Cordillera Mountains or Rocky Mountains. But if this expanse of land was
impossible to acquire, then at least to sufficiently try to retain one degree to the N from
Bodega and to one degree to the east.”105 The petitions of the board of directors of the
RAC in 1825 for settlement of California by peasant-farmers and the expansion of the
colony to the north of Fort Ross to 40–42° n. lat. were also in vain. In fact, the proposals of
the company were supported by such eminent navigators as I. F. Kruzenshtern and V. M.
Golovnin, who recommended acquiring for Russia the port of San Francisco.106 But all
these ideas found no support in government circles. However, as A. A. Istomin correctly
notes, the idea of joining part of northern California to Russia in the mid 1820s did not
seem entirely unreal.107 Furthermore, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not wish
to pursue the formal confirmation of Russian ownership of land in New Albion (northern
California) already occupied by the company. In 1827, the board of directors of the RAC
stated with sadness in a dispatch to the governor of Russian America, P. E. Chistyakov,
that the “endeavors for formal confirmation for Russians of the places where settlement
has been approved remain unsuccessful, and based on present circumstances there is no
hope of a favorable resolution.” In 1829 the leadership arrived at a more categorical
conclusion, that “supporting any hope ... of expansion of settlement would be useless.”108
54  Though the directors of the RAC recognized the economic uselessness of Fort Ross at the
end of the 1820s, they nevertheless did not hasten to part with the California colony,109
hoping with more favorable circumstances to expand it to the north and northeast. The
last attempt in this direction was undertaken by the governor of Russian America, Baron
F. P. Wrangell. In 1834, he began to test the ground in St. Petersburg for negotiations with
the Mexican government with regard to the Fort Ross settlement in California. Wrangell
hoped that the establishment of official diplomatic relations would help not only to state
the right of Russians to Fort Ross, but to expand this enclave. To delay this affair was
dangerous,  since  the  English  or  Americans  could  soon  occupy  California.  Wrangell’s
opinion was supported by the directors of the RAC.110 However, the Council on Political
Questions at the RAC rejected his petition to begin official  negotiations with Mexico,
declaring to  go no farther  than negotiations  about  the  development  of  trade.111 The
Emperor also rejected Wrangell’s proposal in January 1835, having sanctioned only trade
connections.112
55  This resolution placed a definitive end to expansionist plans of the RAC with regard to
the New World. After this began the surrender of positions and the retreat of Russia from
America: in 1839 the strip of mainland coast from the Portland Canal in the south to Cape
Spencer in the north was leased to the English; in 1841 Fort Ross was sold; in 1847 the
British  Hudson’s  Bay  Company  constructed  Fort  Yukon  in  the  territory  of  Russian
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America without sanction of the RAC; and in 1867 the Tsarist government sold Alaska to
the United States, which sharply changed the geostrategic balance in the North Pacific,
and not in Russia’s favor.
X. Conclusion
56  In light of the above investigation, the following conclusions can be drawn. The research
and analysis of documents presented here attest to a complex picture, far from the simple
appraisals of plans of Russian expansion in the New World often proclaimed in the works
of previous researchers.113 At the outset stood the government, which soon delegated the
expansion of  the Empire’s  possessions in America to its  subjects.  It  was  initially  the
government that declared grandiose plans to transform the northern part of the Pacific
Ocean into the “Russian Sea.” These plans were then taken up by representatives of the
merchant class at the end of the eighteenth century and supported by the local Siberian
administration. From the beginning of the nineteenth century the main elaborator of
expansionism  was  the  RAC,  with  complete  passivity  on  the  part  of  the  Tsarist
government. Only at the beginning of the 1820s did official St. Petersburg try once more
to reanimate the old schemes, but they were unsuccessful, after which any plans by the
RAC to  expand possessions  in  America  were  blocked by  the  central  authorities.  The
extremely inconsistent and short-sighted politics of the Tsarist government in the end
led to the loss of the “American bridgehead” in the New World, and as a result a complete
reorientation of colonial expansion to the Amur area and Sakhalin.
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ABSTRACTS
The theme of Russian expansion in the New World and North Pacific in the eighteenth to mid-
nineteenth centuries has repeatedly attracted the attention of Russian and foreign scholars. At
the same time,  the topic evokes discussion in scholarly historiography as authors frequently
adhere to diametrically opposing points of view. In this paper we will investigate the elaboration
of plans for Russian territorial expansion in the New World, noting that these plans often were
an organic part of larger plans to include the whole North Pacific among the possessions of the
Russian Empire.
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